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I. Introduction
The disaggregation or "wrongful conduct" theory in antitrust law
requires plaintiffs seeking treble damages under section four of the Clayton Act' to prove the amount of damages sustained with greater accuracy
than was previously required. Several courts have recently imposed the
requirement in private monopolization actions, a trend that could significantly affect the degree to which private antitrust actions supplement
public trade regulation law enforcement. Specifically, in Berkey Photo, Inc.
v. Eastman Kodak Co. ,2 the Second Circuit applied the disaggregation theory in a treble damage action charging the defendant with illegal monopolization in violation of section two of the Sherman Act. 3 In federal
courts in the ninth and the seventh circuits, the theory adopted by the
Berkey court has generally been
accepted, while the Third Circuit has im4
plicitly rejected the theory.
As a general matter, the disaggregation of damages concept in treble
damage actions is both logical and necessary. The relevant language of
section four of the Clayton Act authorizes recovery of damage suffered
"as a result of a violation of the antitrust laws," and unless a plaintiff's
economic loss produced by market activities of other firms is a result of
illegal conduct there should be no recovery for it. Accordingly, numerous courts have held that plaintiffs must prove their damages flowed
from unlawful anticompetitive acts, not lawful competition. 5 However,
for the reasons discussed hereafter, this general requirement should
have a substantially restricted application in monopolization cases.
The terminology used by courts addressing the disaggregation issue
in monopolization cases or in suits involving allegations of violations of
other antitrust law prohibitions has varied greatly. The Berkey court
spoke of allowing damages only for injury flowing from the "wrongful
1 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). The section, in pertinent part, reads:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in
the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to
the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and
the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
2 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
3 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). The section reads:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars ifa corporation,
or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding
three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
4 Two decisions approving the theory are ILC Peripherals v. IBM Corp. ("Memorex"), 458 F.
Supp. 423, 434 (N.D. Cal. 1978); and MCI Communications v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d
1081, 1161-64 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983). The theory was rejected in Bonjorno v.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 752 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 3284 (1986).
5 See, e.g., Allegheny Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Mid-Atlantic Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 690 F.2d
411, 415 (4th Cir. 1982) (evidence of damages was held to be inadequate because plaintiff failed to
show what portion of its economic losses were caused by alleged illegal predatory pricing by defendant); Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338, 1352-53 (3d Cir. 1975) (Plaintiff's use of
projections to prove damages found to be unacceptable because they did not lead to a reasonable
estimate of damages caused by the alleged violations. The court stated "we cannot permit a jury to
speculate concerning the amount of losses resulting from unlawful, as opposed to lawful,
competition.")
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conduct" of the defendant, and did not mention the term "disaggregation. ' 6 However, two courts that have addressed the issue in the monopolization context have used the term "disaggregation. ' '7 Also, in
reported treble damage decisions involving alleged antitrust violations
other than monopolization, "segregation" has been frequently referred
to as the relevant concept. 8 As this Article specifically focuses upon the
requirement in the context of private monopolization actions, the term
disaggregation will be used to refer to the concept of requiring the plaintiff in a private antitrust action to prove the specific portion, if any, of the
economic loss it suffered from participating in a market was produced by
acts of the defendant that violated the antitrust laws.
Theoretical support for the Berkey court's disaggregation requirement may be found in certain statements in the well-known Areeda &
Turner treatise. 9 The position of Professors Areeda and Turner is that
since the trebling feature of section four of the Clayton Act is "punitive,"
a defendant should not be liable for economic losses suffered by an injured plaintiff unless the losses are proved by the plaintiff to have been
the result of the "wrongful conduct" of the defendant.' 0 Both the academic statement of the wrongful conduct rule as well as those decisions
adopting it in private monopolization cases have been criticized."
Whatever the theoretical and practical justifications for the disaggregation theory at the time of the Berkey decision in 1979, it is now appropriate to reconsider the issue it was designed to address. As discussed
below, recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting
section four of the Clayton Act and section two of the Sherman Act significantly affect the validity of the requirement.' 2 Those decisions and
the disaggregation requirement itself require extensive background discussion to avoid confusion.
II.

Development of the Disaggregation Requirement Controversy
A.

Decisions

In Berkey, the plaintiff, a camera manufacturer and provider of
photofinishing services, alleged that Kodak's marketing of the company's
new 110 Instamatic and Kodacolor X film were unlawful acts of monopolization. At trial, Berkey easily proved Kodak's monopoly positions in
the consumer film and camera markets, and the jury also found that Ko6 See Berkey, 693 F.2d at 296-99.
7 See MCI Communications, 708 F.2d at 1187-92 (Wood, Jr.,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); Litton Sys., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 825 (2d Cir. 1983).
8 See C. HiLLS, ANTmUST ADVISOR 700-01 (3d ed. 1985).
9 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 98-99 (1978).
10 Id. Areeda and Turner refer to "wrongful conduct" as "exclusionary conduct" in their treatise. It is clear that the authors believe that only the specific effects of conduct that is considered
wrongful, or exclusionary, should establish the liability of the defendant.
11 E.g., H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw 413-15, 452-53 (1985); and
Note, Segregation of Antitrust Damages: An Excessive Burden on Private Plaintifls, 72 CALF. L. REv. 403,
423-27 (1984). The disaggregation requirement in private treble damage monopolization cases has
also been approved in academic literature. See Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J. L. &
ECON. 445, 462-67 (1985).
12 See infra text accompanying notes 84-140.
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dak's marketing practices were unlawful acts of monopolization. On the
issue of relief thejury found that Berkey was entitled to recover damages
(before trebling) of $11,500,000 for overcharges it had paid to Kodak in
buying film from the defendant during the four-year period immediately
prior to suit.' 3 The trial court's charge to the jury on this point was, in
effect, that if the jury believed that Berkey had suffered any damage as a
result of Kodak's monopoly in the film market, the plaintiff was entitled
to recover the entire difference between what Kodak's price would have
been if the film market had been competitive, and the price that Berkey
actually paid to Kodak in the monopolized market that existed.14
The Second Circuit reversed the jury's award of $11,500,000 on the
ground that Berkey had not specifically proved that the full amount of
the monopoly overcharge was the result of Kodak's wrongful conduct in
the latter's monopolization of the film market.1 5 Acknowledging a
"dearth of cases on point,"' 6 the court relied upon its understanding of
the Supreme Court's "basic rule for antitrust damages" set forth in the
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. decision in 1977.17 The court
noted that it was possible that Kodak might have held a monopoly position in the film market solely as the result of its fair competitive practices.
In that case Kodak's wrongful conduct would not have added to its monopoly control of the film market, and would not have increased Kodak's
ability to extract a monopoly overcharge from film purchases. Therefore, the court stated it would be penalizing Kodak unnecessarily to make
it respond in damages for the full amount of monopoly overcharge. Instead, the court held that Berkey should have been awarded a pretrebled
sum equal to only that portion of the monopoly overcharge that was the
result of Kodak's unlawful conduct.
Thus, the Berkey court required a plaintiff to estabish the disaggregation of a monopoly overcharge as a precondition of treble damage recovery in a private monopolization case. In effect, the court established an
"antitrust standing" requirement for such plaintiffs.' 8 Three circuit
court opinions have considered the disaggregation requirement in major
monopolization damage cases during the seven years since Berkey.' 9
Although the subsequent decisions have generally not used the terms
"wrongful conduct" or "disaggregation," the arguments that they have
addressed are the same as those accepted by the Berkey court. These decisions, which do not cite Berkey, split on the disaggregation requirement
issue.
13 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 293 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1093 (1980).
14 Id. at 294.
15 Id. at 296-98.
16 Id. at 297.
17 Id. The citation for Brunswick is 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). Brunswick and the basic antitrust
damages rule that it established are discussed at length at infra text accompanying notes 70-83.
18 See discussion of the recent development of the concept of antitrust standing at infra text
accompanying notes 84-114.
19 See infa notes 20-27 and accompanying text. A district court decision one year prior to Berkey
also contains a statement and acceptance of the disaggregation theory. ILC Peripherals Leasing
Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 434, 436 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd sub nom., Memorex Corp. v.
IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981).
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The most complete discussion of the disaggregation issue appears in
the MCI Communications v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. decision of
the Seventh Circuit. 20 In reversing a massive damage award, the court
apparently held that the plaintiff in a private monopolization action must
offer proof on the amount of damage it has suffered as the result of the
illegal acts of the defendant monopolist, and general evidence of the
plaintiff's loss of profits due to the fact that defendant held a monopoly
position in the market is inadequate. 2 1 Although the majority opinion
neither cited Berkey nor used the term "disaggregation," the dissent specifically argued that the disaggregation concept was inappropriate in the
case.22
The disaggregation requirement was again raised in Litton Systems,
Inc. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co..23 The court rejected an argument by defendant AT&T that the plaintiff's damage study was inadequate because it did not segregate the plaintiff's allegedly lost profits on
the basis of those losses resulting from wrongful conduct and those
losses resulting from "lawful activity." The court held that the record

did not support the defendant's argument, and it is unclear whether the
court considered the merits of the argument in rejecting it.24

The clearest rejection of the disaggregation requirement appears in
Bonjorno v. KaiserAluminum & Chemical Corp., decided by the Third Circuit
in 1984.25 In that case, plaintiff Bonjorno had competed with Kaiser Alu-

minum Company in the manufacture and sale of aluminum drainage pipe
in Maryland and surrounding states. Bonjorno claimed that its bankruptcy was caused by Kaiser, which obtained a monopoly position in the
aluminum pipe market as a result of the Bonjorno bankruptcy. The trial
court held that a number of Kaiser practices violated section two of the
Sherman Act and awarded Bonjorno a judgment, after trebling, of
$4,651,560.26
The Third Circuit was unconcerned with the fact that at least some
of Bonjorno's losses leading up to its bankruptcy were attributable to the
fact that Kaiser was a powerful competitor and would have taken substantial sales from the plaintiff without resorting to any unlawful acts. The
court simply held that it was not error for the trial court judge to allow
the jury sitting in the damages part of a bifurcated trial to award damages
based upon the general reduction in value of the plaintiff's business
without receiving guidance from the liability jury on which of the allegedly unlawful acts of the defendant had been determined to be wrongful,
and which had not.2 7 By so holding, the court implicitly rejected the idea
that only damages for economic loss specifically caused by the illegal
conduct of the defendant can be awarded to a plaintiff in a damage action
20
21

708 F.2d 1081, 1161-64 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
Id. at 1161-64.

22
23
24
25
26
27

Id. at 1187-92 (Wood, Jr., J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
700 F.2d 785, 825-26 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984).
Id. at 825.
752 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3284 (1986).
Id. at 806.
Id. at 812-13.
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under section four of the Clayton Act. The Bonjorno court did not consider the legal concepts relevant to an evaluation of the disaggregation
requirement.
A number of factual differences between the Berkey and Bonjorno
cases are evident at a glance. First, Berkey was a "customer" case in which
all or part of an alleged overcharge is the damage suffered. 28 In Bonjorno,
as in MCI and Litton, the party claiming damage was a competitor of the
monopolist, and the plaintiffs sought recovery, in one form or another,
for lost profits. A second point is that the Berkey court held that almost
all of the acts of monopolization allegedly committed by the defendant
were actually not unlawful conduct, while the Bonjorno court sustained a
trial court determination that at least some of the acts defendant com29
plained of were unlawful.
However, the factual differences between the two decisions do not
obscure the fact that in Berkey the court required the plaintiff to prove the
dollar amount of damage it suffered as the result of specified conduct
("wrongful acts") of the defendant, while in Bonjorno the court did not
require any such showing. More specifically, the Berkey court required
the plaintiff in a monopolization case to prove what specific part of the
total economic loss or "damage" it suffered was attributable to the specific wrongful acts of the defendant. On the other hand, the Bonjorno
court held that plaintiff's failure to establish that the losses it suffered
were exclusively due to the defendant's wrongful conduct was of no legal
significance.
B. Underlying Problems
The controversy over disaggregation stems in large part from the
fact that it is extremely difficult to determine the exact damages produced by a specific act that violates the antitrust laws. A risk will always
exist that such uncertain damages will either be too small to adequately
reflect the harm suffered by the plaintiff, or will be too large and unjustly
burden the defendant. The disaggregation requirement clearly places
the "risk of uncertainty" on this issue on the plaintiff. Unless the plaintiff
can prove the precise amount of damage suffered as the result of a specific illegal act of the defendant, the plaintiff will recover nothing under
the Berkey formulation for damage recovery in an action brought under
section four of the Clayton Act on the basis of the defendant's alleged
violation of section two of the Sherman Act.3 0 Of course, many types of
litigation present the issue of which party should bear the burden on a
28 Berkey had prevailed on its claim that it was damaged as a competitor in the camera market in
the trial court, but the circuit court reversed this portion of the judgment without discussion of
damage theory. 603 F.2d at 290. Therefore, the discussion of damages in Berkey is entirely concerned with Berkey's allegations of injury as a customer. Id. at 294-98.
29 See supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
30 Of course, if thejury finds that all of the complained of acts of the defendant were "unlawful"
in that each and all of the acts were illegal acts of the monopolist defendant, the issue of disaggregation will not arise. However, the common issue in monopolization actions is which of the acts of the
defendant can be considered wrongful, and which are blameless under the law that has developed
under section two of the Sherman Act. See infra text accompanying notes 115-40, for a discussion of
the substantive law of monopolization and the importance of distinguishing wrongful from blame-
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particular issue that cannot be resolved with a comforting degree of certainty. The issue, however, is particularly pressing in treble damage antitrust litigation due to the uncertain nature of economic evidence and the
large judgment amounts mandated
by the trebling requirement of sec31
tion four of the Clayton Act.
One thesis of this Article is that courts may have adopted the disaggregation rule in monopolization cases because of a distaste for the uncertainty of substantive monopolization law. This hypothesis is explored
below, with a brief discussion of the law of monopolization and the recent United States Supreme Court decision removing some of the uncertainty attending it.32 If judges have been uncomfortable with the
substantive law of monopolization, the automatic trebling of damage
awards under section four of the Clayton Act is a further inducement to
restrict monopolization damage recovery through the use of the disaggregation requirement. 33 This Article takes the position that the understandable concern of courts over the historically uncertain nature of
monopolization law in the context of the private treble 3damage
action is
4
inadequate support for the disaggretation requirement.
This Article also contends that Berkey's reliance upon the Brunswick
opinion's well-known "antitrust injury" requirement for an award of
damages is misplaced.3 5 In part, this is because Berkey was decided
before the Supreme Court clarified the antitrust injury concept in such
recent decisions as Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready3 6 and Associated General Contractors of California v. California State Council of Carpenters.3 7 Also,
the substantive law of the monopolization prohibition in section two of
the Sherman Act and the policies behind both that section and section
four of the Clayton Act conflict with the view that the antitrust injury
requirement inflexibly requires the plaintiff to disaggregate damages in a
38
monopolization action.
On the other hand, it is clear that the antitrust injury requirement
announced in Brunswick has a significant role to play in assuring that
valid, efficiency-producing competition is not penalized by treble damage
awards. For this reason, this Article offers a proposal for allocating the
crucial risk of uncertainty in actions such as Berkey and Bonjorno. The
author proposes a structure for damage awards that meets the concerns
of those courts that have required disaggregation without eliminating the
significant benefits society realizes from private treble damage enforceless conduct in determining whether the monopolization prohibition in section two has been
violated.
31 The jury verdict amounts in private treble damage monopolization actions can be noteworthy
even without trebling, e.g., in Berkey the jury awarded the plaintiff $37,620,130, and in MCI the jury
awarded $1,800,000,000. See 603 F.2d at 268 (Berkey) and 708 F.2d at 1092 (MCI).
32 See infra text accompanying notes 115-40.
33 Possible judicial concern over the trebling feature of § 4 of the Clayton Act is discussed at
infra text accompanying note 59.
34 See infra text accomapnying notes 156-57.
35 See infra text accompanying notes 142-49.
36 457 U.S. 465 (1982); see infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
37 459 U.S. 519 (1983); see infra notes 91-114 and accompanying text.
38 See infra text accompanying notes 142-49.
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ment of the monopolization prohibition of section two of the Sherman
Act.
To furnish the reader with a review of the legal and theoretical context of the disaggregation theory, the first topic for discussion in this Article is the basic principles of treble damage recovery.8 9 The decisions of
the United States Supreme Court during the seven year period since the
Brunswick decision dominate this topic. 40 The second necessary background topic is narrower in focus-the law of private monopolization actions. Such suits are brought under section four of the Clayton Act, and
involve allegations that the defendant has harmed the plaintiff by violating the monopolization prohibition in section two of the Sherman Act. 4 1
The two most prominent subjects in considering the topic are the substantive law of the monopolization prohibition and recent private monopolization action decisions rendered by federal Circuit and District
Courts.

42

III.

The Law of Treble Damages Under Section Four
of the Clayton Act
A.

Basic Considerations

The essential language of section four of the Clayton Act has remained unchanged since the original enactment of the statute in 1914. 4 3
The section has a broad sweep: "Any person.., injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue
therefor... and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
44
and ... a reasonable attorney's fee."
In suits involving claims of overcharges from price fixing in violation
of section one of the Sherman Act, courts have held that the phrase "any
person" includes business firms, 4 5 state and local governments, 46 foreign
nations, 4 7 and consumers. 4 8 The Supreme Court has reviewed only a few
treble damage actions in which the plantiff's primary allegation was that
the defendant violated the monopolization prohibition in section two of
39 See Part III, infra text accompanying notes 43-59.
40 The Supreme Court decisions of the last seven years on the topic of treble damages are reviewed at infra text accompanying notes 60-69.
41 See Part IV., infra text accompanying notes 115-40.
42 The law of monopolization is discussed at infra text accompanying notes 115-40. The private
monopolization action decisions are discussed at supra text accompanying notes 13-29.
43 When § 4 was passed in 1914, it recodified and superseded § 7 of the original Sherman Act of
1890. In 1980 and 1982, § 4 was amended to include awards of interest, and subsections (b) and (c),
dealing with recoveries by foreign nations, were added.
44 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
45 Coast v. Hunt Oil Co., 195 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952), holding that
partnerships are "persons" under § 4. Cf. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 606 (1941)
(holding that corporations are also "persons"); and United States v. Brookman Co., 229 F. Supp.
862, 864 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
46 Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945) and Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S.
159, 162 (1942) held that states are persons under the section. Chattanooga Foundry v. City of
Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906) held that the term includes cities.
47 Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 318 (1978). After this decision, Congress passed legislation
to limit recovery by foreign governments to single damages, subject to certain exceptions. 15 U.S.C.

§ 15(b) (1982).
48

Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 341 (1979).
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the Sherman Act. It is clear, however, that the word "person" in section
four of the Clayton Act will be interpreted in the same broad fashion in
all actions brought under the section regardless 4of
the provision of the
9
antitrust law allegedly violated by the defendant.
Federal courts have long viewed private treble damage actions with
favor. This view is based on the perception that private actions are necessary to supplement the efforts of federal government enforcement of
the antitrust laws. 50 On the other hand, Congress has passed a number
of laws in the last ten years carving out limited exemptions from the automatic treble damages feature of section four in actions involving certain forms of economic activity. 5 1 This legislative activity indicates, at
least in part, a concern over the uncertainty of economic determinations
by courts and juries.
A risk of uncertainty attends any courtroom determination of fact,
and rules concerning burdens of persuasion and standards of proof have
historically been used to control and allocate the risk of uncertainty in
lawsuits. The burden of persuasion requires a party to convince the
finder of fact of the existence of a particular fact by the introduction of
relevant, admissible evidence of the particular fact. For example, a plaintiff brings an action under section four of the Clayton Act, alleging that
defendants A and B fixed prices and the plaintiff was thereby forced to
pay an overcharge in purchasing the product sold by A or B. The plaintiff introduces evidence showing that defendant competitors A and B
agreed to fix prices, and defendants A and B introduce evidence tending
to prove that they did not fix prices. The plaintiff would have the burden
of persuasion and the finder of fact must rule that the fact (that defendants A and B agreed to fix prices) does not exist unless the plaintiff's evidence is more persuasive to the finder of fact than is the evidence
produced by defendants A and B.
A second legal consideration in this area is the standard of proof,
which establishes the degree of certainty of the existence of a fact that a
party with the burden of persuasion must meet in order to prevail on the
49 See, e.g. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 488-89 (1968).
50 E.g., in reference to the passing-on defense, the Hanover Shoe court stated that if it were allowed, buyers
would have only a tiny stake in a lawsuit and little interest in attempting a class action. In
consequence, those who violate the antitrust laws by price fixing or monopolizing would
retain the fruits of their illegality because no one was available who would bring suit against
them. Treble-damage actions, the importance of which the Court has many times emphasized, would be substantially reduced in effectiveness.
Id. at 494.
51 See, e.g., the Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003 (1982). The Act
established a procedure which permits persons engaged in export trade to receive a certificate that
sets the limits of their antitrust liability. The Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 3501-3503 created a new legal standard for judging the reasonableness of territorial restraints
imposed on bottlers. The National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 provided that in cases involving joint research and development ventures, courts shall apply the rule of
reason, impose single damages and permit recoveries of attorneys' fees by defendant in certain circumstances. The Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 provides that treble
damages are not recoverable from any local government, nor any official or employee acting in official capacity.
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factual issue.5 2 For example, under the standard of proof applicable in
criminal prosecutions, the state must prove the facts necessary to establish the guilt of the accused "beyond a reasonable doubt." The usual
standard in civil litigation is proof by a "preponderance of the evidence,"
meaning that the trier of fact must be convinced that it is "more probable
than not" that a certain fact exists. In certain civil actions, the party with
the burden of persuasion of a fact must meet a higher standard of proof
requiring a showing that a fact exists by "clear and convincing proof,"
meaning that the finder of fact must be convinced that it is "highly probable" that a particular fact exists. The plaintiff generally has the burden
of persuasion on all facts necessary to establish the cause of action, and
the defendant has the burden of persuasion on all facts necessary to establish the elements of an affirmative defense. The standard of proof
applicable to the finding of a particular fact in a civil action will usually be
either "preponderance of the evidence" or "clear and convincing proof."
The burden of persuasion and the standard of proof are important
concepts to keep in mind when considering the disaggregation requirement. Generally, under section four of the Clayton Act, the plaintiff has
the burden of persuasion on the factual issues of whether the defendant
violated any of the antitrust laws, whether the defendant's antitrust violation injured the plaintiff in its business or property and the amount of
damage to its business or property that the plaintiff suffered. The risk of
uncertainty is thus placed upon the plaintiff in that if the fact finder is
uncertain that any of the three facts has been proven, plaintiff cannot
recover damages.
In order to ease the plaintiff's burden of persuasion in damage actions under section four of the Clayton Act, the Supreme Court adjusted
the applicable standard of proof to reflect the fact that determining the
effect of a specific action in an economic market is a highly uncertain
enterprise. In Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co. ,53 the
Court announced that the burden of proof on the issue of the amount of
damage suffered by the plaintiff would be less rigorous than the standard
of proof required on the issue of whether the plaintiff sustained some injury from the defendant's antitrust violation.5 4 In subsequent decisions,
the Court has held that the plaintiff must meet the preponderance of the
evidence standard and prove that the occurrence of the fact of injury to
the plaintiff was "more probable than not." However, the Court has held
that the amount of the injury sustained may be proved by a "just and rea55
sonable inference" from the evidence presented by the plaintiff.

In allowing a greater degree of uncertainty in the proof of the
52 See G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 15, 15 n.2 (1978); MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE §§ 336, 337 (Cleary rev. 3d ed. 1984).
53 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
54 Id. at 562, 566.
55 J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 565-67 (1981). See also Zenith
Radio Corp v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 339 (1971); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 (1969); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264
(1946); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379 (1927).
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amount of damage, the Court has discussed its justifications several
times. Most recently, the Court has declared:
Our willingness to accept a degree of uncertainty in these cases
rests in part on the difficulty of ascertaining business damages as compared, for example, to damages resulting from a personal injury or
from condemnation of a parcel of land. The vagaries of the marketplace usually deny us sure knowledge of what plaintiff's situation
been in the absence of the defendant's antitrust
would have
56
violation.
A second reason for the "lower" measure of proof for the amount of
damages is that it would be "a perversion of fundamental principles of
justice" to deny recovery of damages to the plaintiff because the defendthe ascertainant's violation of law "is of such a nature as to '5preclude
7
ment of the amount of damages with certainty."
The standard of proof on the issue of whether the defendant violated an antitrust law has always been the traditional preponderance of
the evidence test. The lack of debate on this issue is perhaps misleading,
however, because the issue of what type of conduct on the part of the
defendant the plaintiff must prove to establish a violation of section two
58
of the Sherman Act has traditionally been extremely controversial.
This uncertainty in the substantive law of section two of the Sherman Act
has clouded the violation issue in monopolization treble damage actions.
The Berkey disaggregation requirement reflects, to some extent, judicial
reluctance to impose large damages for a violation of a skeletal statutory
prohibition which federal courts have not clearly interpreted.5 9
To summarize, the Supreme Court has long held that a plaintiff in a
private antitrust damage action must prove the fact of the defendant's
antitrust violation by a preponderance of the evidence and the fact of
antitrust injury by the same measure of proof; but the amount of the
damages plaintiff suffered may be proved by a just and reasonable inference. Such an inference does not necessarily prove it was more likely
than not that plaintiff sustained a certain amount of damages. The inference merely establishes that the amount of damages awarded was not
arrived at by mere speculation. The plaintiff still bears the burden of the
uncertainty of predicting economic marketplace results in establishing an
award of damages, but the lower standard of proof eases that burden
significantly.
B.

Modern Interpretationof Section Four of the Clayton Act and the Concern
Over Uncertainty

The Supreme Court noted the need to maintain treble damage recovery to supplement government antitrust enforcement in Hanover Shoe,
Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 60 This treble damage action was
56
57
58
59
60

Truett Payne, 451 U.S. at 566.
See id. at 567 (quoting Eastman Kodak, 273 U.S. at 379).
See infra text accompanying notes 125-40.
See discussion at infra text accompanying notes notes 155-58.
392 U.S. 481, 491-94 (1967).
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brought by a lessee of shoe machines produced by the defendant, an alleged illegal monopolist. The plaintiff claimed it would have purchased
defendant's machines had it been offered the option, but defendant
maintained a lease-only policy. The defendant was a monopolist, and
because its lease-only policy had an anticompetitive effect, the policy had
earlier been held to be exclusionary conduct which violated section two
of the Sherman Act.6 1 The plaintiff claimed the rental price for defendant's machines was inflated and sought to recover the rental overcharge
under section four of the Clayton Act. In response, the defendant asserted that any rental overcharge paid by the plaintiff was imposed
equally on all of the monopolist's rental customers, and that all of the
defendant's customers, including the plaintiff, used the rented machines
to produce shoes that were in turn sold to retailers. The defendant argued that the plaintiff "passed on" any rental overcharge by increasing
the price charged for plaintiff's shoes. Thus, according to defendant's
argument, the plaintiff suffered no injury or damages for purposes of section four of the Clayton Act.
The Court rejected the monopolist-defendant's argument on two
grounds, both of which have significance for the disaggregation requirement controversy. First, to accept the economic propositions inherent in
defendant's argument would "require additional long and complicated
62
proceedings involving massive evidence and complicated theories."
This would deter plaintiffs who might otherwise bring actions. Second,
the defense, if accepted, could be asserted against each customer of a
product allegedly impacted by the original monopolist's overcharge,
down to the ultimate consumer of the final end product. In the case at
bar, the end product was shoes, and the Court rightly declared that consumers of such items would have only a "tiny stake in a lawsuit and little
interest in attempting a class action." 63 This also would reduce the
number of treble damage actions brought and allow antitrust violators to
"retain the fruits of their illegality."'
The Supreme Court's decision in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. 6 5 initiated a series of important decisions developing the concept of standing
to seek damages under section four of the Clayton Act. The concept was
in part a response to the uncertainty inherent in economic evidence, but
the Hawaii decision did not focus on this concern. The decision involved
the claim of the state of Hawaii that a price fixing conspiracy had artificially inflated the price of gasoline within the state. The state further
alleged that the high price of gasoline impeded development of the
state's economy. Hawaii sought treble damage recovery for the reduction in the amount of growth of the state's economy caused by the defendants' alleged gasoline overcharging. It is reasonably certain that
artificial inflation of the price of a commodity as basic to industrial
61 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., I10 F. Supp. 295, 343-44 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd,
347 U.S. 521 (1954).
62 392 U.S. at 493.
63 Id. at 494.
64 Id.
65 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
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growth as gasoline will retard the growth of a state's economy. The issue
presented, however, was strictly one of statutory construction-whether
Hawaii's claim was for damage to its "business or property" as required
under section four of the clayton Act. The Court held that Hawaii's
claim was not within the phrase and denied treble damage recovery
under the statute. In passing, the court implied concern over the uncertainty of economic evidence by noting that determining the injury to the
economy of a state would require "an examination of the impact ...
upon every variable that affects the State's economic health-a task extremely difficult, 'in the real economic world ....
66
Two years after Hawaii, the Court voiced more direct concern over
the uncertainty of economic evidence in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.67 Like
Hawaii, this case addressed the issue of what sort of injury is compensable under section four of the Clayton Act. Although no standing issue
was involved, the Court held that purchasers of brick buildings from general contractors could not collect damages from the brick manufacturers
that allegedly fixed the price of the bricks used by the contractors in constructing the building. Basing its holding on the ground of uncertainty,
the Court specifically stated that "we do not address the standing issue." 6 8 The bricks in question were manufactured by defendants, who
sold them to masonry contractors. The masonry contractors in turn contracted with general building contractors to construct brick walls and
other brick structures in buildings to be built by the general contractors.
The plaintiffs, approximately seven hundred governmental entities,
purchased the buildings through bid procedures from the general contractors. The Court held that indirect purchasers of the bricks, including
the plaintiffs, did not suffer injury for which they could recover damages
under section four of the Clayton Act because of an illegal overcharge
imposed upon the direct purchasers, the masonry contractors. This
holding was considered necessary because of the complexity and uncertainty of determining how much of the overcharge was "passed on" to
the indirect purchasers and because the defendants otherwise might be
69
faced with multiple and overlapping liabilities.
C.

The Brunswick Decision and Antitrust Standing
In 1977, the Court significantly changed the focus of Clayton section
four by specifically addressing the "antitrust standing" issue in Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc..70 The plaintiffs, operators of several
bowling centers, alleged that Brunswick had violated section seven of the
66 Id. at 263 n.14.
67 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
68 Id. at 728 n.7.
69 The Court also specifically relied upon its prior decision in Hanover Shoe, in which it held that
a seller who imposes an illegal overcharge on a direct purchaser cannot escape liability to that purchaser by arguing that the purchaser merely "passed on" the illegal overcharge by increasing the
prices it charged for the products or services it sold to the general public or to other firms. See supra
text accompanying notes 60-64. In Hanover, the Court had rejected the defensive use of the pass-on
theory and in Illinois Brick a majority of the Court held that it would be inconsistent with Hanover to
allow the offensive use of the pass-on theory.
70 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
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Clayton Act by acquiring and resurrecting certain bowling centers that
would otherwise have gone bankrupt and ceased doing business. As
competitors of the centers that would have gone out of existence, plaintiffs claimed injury in the amount of the profits denied them because of
the competition they faced from the resurrected bowling centers. The
court of appeals affirmed a district court judgment for $6,575,040, but
the Supreme Court reversed.
Brunswick had allegedly violated section seven of the Clayton Act,
which prohibits mergers or acquisitions that "may ... substantially...
lessen competition" in any market. 7 ' The "anticompetitive effect" theory of the plaintiffs' case was that Brunswick, as a giant corporation with
a "deep pocket," would intimidate small bowling center operators who
attempted to compete with it in local bowling center markets. These intimidated small operators would not challenge the Brunswick-owned
centers through aggressive competition, fearing heavy retaliation. Thus,
at the time Brunswick acquired the failing bowling centers, one could
reasonably predict that the acquisitions would substantially lessen competition. Both the district court and the court of appeals accepted this
theory of violation, and the Supreme Court accepted it for the purpose of
72
addressing the standing issue.
The plaintiffs' theory of damages was simplicity itself. Because the
plaintiff bowling centers would have had larger market shares if the
Brunswick-acquired bowling centers had gone out of business, the plaintiffs argued they were entitled to recover the lost profits that the reduction in their market shares necessarily entailed. 7 3 The plaintiffs'
argument posed the question of whether a plaintiff able to prove an antitrust law violation could recover any loss of profit "casually linked" to
the violation. The Supreme Court definitively rejected the plaintiffs' theory because that principle would divorce "antitrust recovery from the
purposes of the antitrust laws without a clear statutory command to do so
"74

The Court reasoned that the merger was, arguendo, illegal because
it brought a " 'deep pocket' parent into a market of 'pygmies'," yet the
loss of income suffered by plaintiffs because of the continued existence of
the acquired bowling centers "bears no relationship to the size of either
the acquiring company (Brunswick) or its competitors [the plaintiffs]." '7 5
To the trial and appellate courts, the fact that Brunswick's size gave it the
71 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
72 This theory of anticompetitive effect, which establishes a violation of § 7 when a very large
corporation merges into a market in which it will compete with much smaller and less well-financed
rivals, has been referred to as the market entrenchment theory. See the 1968 Justice Department
Merger Guidelines, 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 4510 (1982). The United States Supreme Court first
announced the theory in F.T.C. v. Proctor & Gamble Co. (Clorox), 386 U.S. 578 (1967). In Brunswick, the court mentions the theory several times. See, e.g., 429 U.S. 477, 482, 487 & 490.
73 The Court of Appeals expressly accepted the plaintiffs' theory of damages in deciding that the
Brunswick acquisitions were illegal, and, since the acquired bowling centers would have otherwise
gone out of business, any loss "casually linked" to "the mere presence of the violator in the market"
could be recovered by the plaintiffs. See Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 487 (quoting NBO Indus. Treadway
Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262, 272-73 (3d Cir. 1973)).
74 429 U.S. at 487.
75 Id.
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capacity to substantially harm competition through intimidation was
enough to support its liability even though there was no evidence that
the company had actually used its size to intimidate smaller rivals. 76 The
loss suffered by the plaintiffs, however, was not a product of the large
size of Brunswick compared to its rivals, and this was the only aspect of
the merger that had made it illegal under section seven. Therefore, the
Supreme Court held that "respondents' injury was not of 'the type that
the statute was intended to forestall.' 77
The foregoing would have been sufficient for the Court to deny
plaintiffs recovery under section four of the Clayton Act. The Court,
however, went further and noted that "the antitrust laws are not merely
indifferent to the injury claimed here," because the antitrust laws were
78
enacted to protect competition and not individual competitors.
Although the Court's opinion does not clarify the point, it is nonetheless
clear that the Court was impressed with the fact that plaintiffs' theory
required an exclusive focus on the economic health of the plaintiffs, without considering either the competitive health of the markets in which the
plaintiffs competed, or the relationship between the anticompetitive acts
of the defendant and the economic health of the plaintiffs.
The Court discussed antitrust standing, or the right to recover damages for "antitrust injury," in the following terms:
[F]or plaintiffs to recover treble damages on account of § 7 violations,
they must prove more than injury causally linked to an illegal presence
in the market. Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that
flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. The injury
should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of
anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation. It should, in
short, be "the type of loss that the claimed violations .

.

. would be

likely to cause.'7D

The quoted passage establishes two alternative concepts of "antitrust injury," injury necessarily resulting from the antitrust violation, or
injury from acts made possible by the violation. These concepts were
announced in a review of a treble damage award allegedly caused by a
violation of section seven of the Clayton Act, a prophylactic statute which
requires a prediction of future anticompetitive effect, as opposed to a
finding that actual injury to competition or to a competitor has occurred.
Four years later, the Supreme Court noted the prophylactic nature of the
statute addressed by the Brunswick court in J. Truett Payne Co., Inc. v.
Ch7ysler Motors Corp.8 0 The issue in Truett Payne was whether treble damages were automatically available to a plaintiff upon proof that the defendant violated section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act.8 1 The Court
held that since the Robinson-Patman Act only requires proof that injury
76 Id at 481-84.
77 Id. at 487-88 (quoting Wyandotte Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202 (1967)).

78 Id at 488.
79 Id at 489 (quoting Zenith, 395 U.S. at 125) (emphasis in original).
80 451 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1981).
81 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982).
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to competition may result, the proof of a violation does not establish that
a competitor has been injured
for the purpose of an action under section
82
four of the Clayton Act.
Although the prophylactic nature of the statutory provision considered in Brunswick was extremely important to the antitrust injury discussion in that case, the Berkey court adopted the Brunswick language without
discussing the difference between section seven of the Clayton Act and
83
the monopolization prohibition in section two of the Sherman Act.
The monopolization prohibition is not violated unless the process of
competition has been injured, while section seven requires only a showing that injury to competition may occur. The failure of the Berkey decision to appreciate the prophylactic nature of the statute involved in
Brunswick calls the validity of the disaggregation requirement announced
in Berkey into question.
D.

Merger of the Concern Over Speculation and the Antitrust Standing Concept

The Court reaffirmed the principle that section four of the Clayton
Act should receive an expansive reading to deter violators and compensate victims in Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready. 84 Plaintiff McCready, a
Blue Cross health plan subscriber, obtained psychotherapy services from
a psychologist and sought reimbursement from Blue Shield. When Blue
Shield denied payment, plaintiff filed a treble damage action alleging a
boycott between Blue Shield and the state psychiatrist association to
deny payment to Blue Cross subscribers who received therapy from psychologists, rather than psychiatrists. The trial court held that McCready
had no standing to seek antitrust damages, and the Supreme Court reversed. The Court distinguished Hawaii and Illinois Brick on the ground
that since McCready had paid her psychologist's bill and was seeking repayment of that exact sum her claim involved no danger of duplicative
recovery and was not speculative in nature. 8 5
To the argument that the plaintiff's injury was too "remote" from
the alleged violation to give her standing, the Court had a two part reply.
First, the economic and physical connection between the alleged boycott
violation and the harm suffered by the plaintiff was very close, the plaintiff being " 'within that area of the economy . . .endangered by' " the
defendant's illegal boycott agreement.8 6 The second part of the reply
addressed the Brunswick requirement that the injury involved must be of
"'the type the statute was intended to forestall.' "87 Noting that defendants were alleged to have entered into an agreement to coercively boycott patients of psychologists into using psychiatrists, the Court found
that the injury to those patients was "inextricably intertwined" with the
82 The Court also noted the persuasive legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act as a separate ground for its holding on this point. 451 U.S. at 562-63.
83 See infra text accompanying notes 142-49.
84 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
85 Id. at 474-75.
86 Id. at 480-81 (quoting In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No.31, 481 F.2d 122,
129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub noma.,
Morgan v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n., 414 U.S. 1405 (1972)).
87 Id. at 481 (quoting Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202 (1967)).
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injury the boycotters intended to inflict and "[fell] squarely within the
area of Congressional concern." 8 8
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that an injury suffered by
the plaintiff must be of an exact type that the antitrust laws were intended
to prevent in order for the plaintiff to recover under section four of the
Clayton Act.8 9 The response of the majority was that this view is "unrealistically narrow" in that it focuses on only a certain type of market
participant as being a possible plaintiff. To the majority, any market participant can suffer injury of the type that conveys standing to bring a
treble damage action, as long as the participant was engaging in an activity that the proscribed conduct was likely to impact. 90
In the next term, Associated GeneralContractorsof California,Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters thoroughly analyzed the treble damage
standing question. 9 ' Reviewing a number of concerns addressed in McCready, the Court set forth an integrated Clayton section four standing
analysis for the first time. Plaintiff California State Council of Carpenters
("Union") alleged that all members of Associated, an association of
building contractors, had agreed to subcontract for carpenter services
only with nonunion subcontractors. The Union also alleged that Associated had pressured property owners and other builders to engage in the
same subcontracting practice. This conduct was further alleged
to have
92
weakened and restrained the trade of certain contractors.
The Court assumed, arguendo, that the alleged conduct would constitute a coercive boycott in violation of the antitrust laws, and proceeded
to determine whether the unions had standing to seek antitrust damages
under section four of the Clayton Act. 93 To reach the legal issue of
standing, the Court also assumed: (1) that the weakened and restrained
contractors were those who did business with unionized carpentry subcontractors, and (2) that the plaintiff Union might thereby have suffered
harm because it would be difficult to sign collective bargaining contracts
94
with nonunion firms seeking to avoid the boycott.
Noting that common law concepts have always been properly used in
interpreting section four of the Clayton Act, the Court opened a new era
of "antitrust standing" analysis. First, the Court established that the concept of antitrust standing differs significantly from the constitutional concept of standing to litigate. 95 Proof of the fact of injury is enough to
satisfy the constitutional standing requirement, but antitrust standing requires a "further determination whether the plaintiff is a proper party to
bring a private antitrust action [for treble damages under section four of
88 Id. at 481-84.
89
90
91

Id. at 486 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
I- at 484 n.21.
459 U.S. 519 (1983).

92 Id. at 528.
93 Id. at 528. Neither the complaint nor the lower court opinions were models of clarity, and the
Supreme Court devotes no little effort to making assumptions about the facts alleged in the complaint and the theories of the District Court and the Court of Appeals opinions.
94 Id at 528 (unionized subcontractors assumed to be the target of the boycott); i& at 541 n.46
(Union might have suffered several possible economic injuries from defendant's coercion).
95 Id. at 535 n.31.
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the Clayton Act] .,96 This determination requires an evaluation of three
major topics: "[T]he plaintiff's harm, the alleged wrongdoing by the de97
fendants, and the relationship between them."
The Court described the antitrust standing requirement as being
very similar to the common law concept of "proximate cause," an elusive
notion that has long bedeviled first year law students studying torts. 98
Neither antitrust standing nor proximate cause are concepts which allow
a court to "announce a black-letter rule that will dictate the result in
every case." 9 9 In this connection, the Court quoted from Judge Andrews' famous dissent in the Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co. decision, in
which theJudge noted that proximate cause was not a concept producing
easy solutions to problems. TheJudge stated: "What we do mean by the
word 'proximate' is, that because of convenience, of public policy, of a
rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of
events beyond a certain point."1 0 0
However uncertain in application the concept of antitrust standing
may be, the Court clearly held that neither proof that the plaintiff suffered economic loss because of the defendant's antitrust violation, nor
proof that the defendant intended to injure the plaintiff by the violation
is sufficient to establish antitrust standing. 1° 1 The first fact is obviously a
precondition, and the second may be relevant. However, neither fact is
sufficient by itself to support the conclusion that antitrust standing exists
in a particular case.
The Court listed four factors that must be considered in an action
brought under section four of the Clayton Act to determine if the plaintiff possesses antitrust standing. The first is the nature of the harm the
plaintiff allegedly suffered, and the inquiry is whether the harm is "of the
type that the antitrust statute was intended to forestall." 1° 2 Apparently,
only a customer or a competitor of the antitrust violator suffers harm of
the type Congress envisioned. Since in the case before the Court the
Union was neither,
it could not qualify for antitrust standing on the basis
03
of this factor.'
96 Id.
97 Id at 535; see infra discussion in text accompanying notes 109-10.
98 Proximate cause is said to exist when a court holds that damages from a tort injury suffered by
the plaintiff are recoverable from the defendant in a civil case. In such situations, courts frequently
say that the defendant's tortious act was the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the plaintiff.
Conversely, courts often declare that there is no proximate cause between defendant's tort and the
injury suffered by the plaintiff if a judicial determination has been made that the defendant should
not be liable to the injured plaintiff. See D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, PROSSER & KEErON ON
TORTS (5th ed. 1984). "[Proximate cause requires] some reasonable connection between the act or
omission of the defendant and the damage which plaintiff has suffered." Id. at 263. "The term
Iproximate cause' is applied by the courts to those more or less undefined considerations which limit
liability even where the fact of causation is clearly established." Id at 273. "[Proximate cause is] the
limitation which the courts have placed upon the actor's responsibility for the consequences of the
actor's conduct." Id. at 264.
99 459 U.S. at 536.
100 Id. at 536-37 n.34 (quoting Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 351-52, 162 N.E.
99, 103 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting)).
101 Id. at 537.
102 Id. at 540. The language used by the Court is almost identical to that used in Brunswick, 429
U.S. at 487-488.
103 459 U.S. at 539-40. The Court starts its discussion on this point by stating that the antitrust
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The second factor is the directness of the injury suffered. 10 4 Indirect
injuries are suffered by firms that are neither customers nor competitors
of the antitrust violator. A firm suffering an indirect injury suffers such
injury because of actions taken in response to the antitrust violation by a
firm that was either a customer or competitor of the antitrust violator.
The most obvious situation in which an indirect injury occurs is the
passed-on overcharge paid by an "indirect purchaser." 10 5 Indirect injuries are highly disfavored by the Court because of "conceptual difficulties" in measuring the amount of damage and the fact that firms suffering
adequate private treble damage endirect injury will normally provide
10 6
forcement to deter antitrust.
The third antitrust standing factor is speculativeness. The Court's
discussion, however, indicates that courts may consider this factor only in
situations in which the plaintiff's economic injury is indirect and may
have been produced by causes that are independent of the antitrust violation. 10 7 The fourth and final factor listed by the Court is manageability
of the plaintiff's damage action, which is primarily a matter of determining if a number of plaintiffs on different levels in the0 8product distribution
chain will necessarily be involved in the litigation.'
Thus, in the antitrust standing analysis discussion in Associated General Contractors, the Court spoke of four factors to be considered: Type,
directness, speculativeness, and manageability. However, the Court concentrated on only one factor, the type of harm suffered by the plaintiff, in
order to determine whether the plaintiff's injury was of the type for
which Congress intended to provide a remedy in passing the antitrust
laws. Actually, the Court appeared far more concerned with the type of
plaintiff than the type of injury alleged. Thus, the real concern about
type is whether the plaintiff is reasonably within a class that Congress
intended to protect by the passage of the antitrust laws. In the opinion,
the Court listed only customers and competitors as entities suffering the
type of harm Congress intended to prevent by passing the antitrust statutes. 10 9 Because both customers and competitors are classes of entities
immediately affected by the acts of an antitrust violator, the second factor
of directness is necessarily subsumed in the Court's analysis of the type
of harm; and the third and fourth factors are also apparently inconselaws were intended "to assure customers the benefits of price competition." Id at 538. Apparently
competitors also suffer the type of injury Congress wanted to forestall by the passage of the antitrust
statutes. Id at 539. The Court was much impressed by the fact that the plaintiff in the case was a
labor union and that labor unions do not generally approve of competition in those markets in which
they are attempting to organize workers. Id at 539. The Court also believed that it was significant
that Congress adopted other distinct statutes addressing the problems of labor union, and that there
is a broad exemption from antitrust laws for labor union activities. These enactments indicate that
antitrust law is, in general, not designed to protect unions in the context of management relations.
l at 539-40.
104 459 U.S. at 541.
105 See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
106 459 U.S. at 541-42.
107 Id at 542-43.
108 Itt at 543-45.
109 It at 538-40.
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quential for the same reason.' 10
Labor unions were almost certainly outside the class or classes of
entities Congress intended to protect with the passage of the antitrust
laws. Therefore, the Court was not required to canvass the types of market participants that could reasonably have been objects of Congress'
protective intentions when it passed the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Certainly, one cannot easily read the decision to imply that only customers
and competitors were within the requisite intent of Congress, as there is
every reason to believe that such firms as those forced to sell products at
an artificially low price due to a price fixing conspiracy of purchasers
were also within the protection intended by Congress.
In the Brunswick and Associated General Contractors decisions, the Court
provided two concepts which may be used to attempt a synthesis of the
Court's decisions in the area of antitrust standing. The "result of anticompetitive consequences" concept from Brunswick, while valuable, is
actually inconsistent with two of the Court's five antitrust standing decisions, Hawaii and Illinois Brick."1 On the other hand, the Court's factor
analysis in Associated General Contractors rationalizes all of the Court's decisions in this area, and provides a theoretical synthesis for lower courts.
The Court's focus upon the type of economic relationship between
the plaintiff and the defendant, and the directness of the injury suffered
by the plaintiff in Associated General Contractors established that consideration of these two factors would control the issue of antitrust standing.
Analyzing the facts presented in prior antitrust standing decisions of the
Court relevant to the type of relationship and directness of injury factors
explains the holdings of those decisions and provides a principle for future application. In Illinois Brick and Associated General Contractors, the
plaintiffs were not customers or competitors of the defendant, and the
plaintiffs did not bear the direct brunt of the antitrust violation. In both
cases, antitrust standing was denied. In Hanover Shoe, the antitrust violator's customer was the plaintiff, and in McCready the plaintiff was in a
customer relationship with Blue Shield, a member of the group of illegal
110 The fact that customers and competitors are directly affected by the violators' acts means that
the damages sustained by such plaintiff firms will be as certain and non-speculative as damages are
likely to be in private antitrust actions. Thus, there would be no concern over the speculativeness of
damage claims by firms within those two classes. Also, Illinois Brick apparently teaches that firms that
do not experience the effect of an antitrust violator's acts directly will rarely be allowed to obtain
treble damage recovery under § 4 of the Clayton Act. Thus, questions of manageability of damage
actions brought by firms that are not either customers or competitors of the antitrust violator will
seldom be raised.
111 The allegation that the economy of the state of Hawaii would be damaged, through a lower
growth rate, by prolonged artificially high gasoline prices is not open to question. Similarly, the
assertion that the state would realize lower revenues from sales, franchise, income, and other taxes
due to the lessened growth of the state's economy is incontravertable. Thus, it would appear that
the damage alleged by the state was a result of the anticompetitive consequences of the defendants'
alleged price fixing violation of the Sherman Act.
Similarly, the Illinois Brick indirect purchasers undoubtedly paid an overcharge in some amount
as a consequence of the defendnats' alleged price fix on the sales of bricks to contractors. The
immediate anticompetitive result of that antitrust violation logically would be an increase in the price
of the bricks when purchased by the contractors. This price increase in turn must have resulted in an
increase in the price the plaintiff governmental entities paid for the brick structures they bought
from the contractors.
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boycotters. The Court held that antitrust standing was established in
both decisions. Finally, in Brunswick the court found that the acts of the

defendant generated no anticompetitive consequences. Accordingly, the
Court did not consider facts relating to either the type or directness

factors.112
The disaggregation requirement in Berkey does not accord with the
factor analysis of the antitrust standing issue in Associated General Contractors.1 13 As will be discussed, this conflict additionally justifies the Third
Circuit's rejection
of the disaggregation requirement in the Bonjorno
14
decision.1
IV. The Development of the Law of Monopolization
A full consideration of the disaggregation requirement in private
monopolization actions requires an understanding of the substantive law

of monopolization for two reasons. First, the plaintiff in such actions
must establish that the defendant has violated the monopolization prohibition in section two of the Sherman Act in order to recover treble damages under section four of the Clayton Act. Second, one can argue that a

number of courts have adopted the disaggregation requirement in private monopolization actions because of the ambiguous nature of the substantive monopolization offense. 115 Some of the ambiguities of the
monopolization offense have been resolved by the Supreme Court's recent Aspen Skiing 116 decision, and this development is of great importance in evaluating the disaggregation requirement in private
17
monopolization cases."
The basic elements of the monopolization offense under section two
of the Sherman Act are easily stated. First, the defendant must be shown
to possess monopoly power in the market in which it operates. Second,
the monopolist's market power must have been either obtained or maintained by "exclusionary conduct" that differs from socially desirable
competitive practices. Although both elements obviously require resolutions of complex factual and legal questions, the second element has consistently been a source of greater controversy in decisions and academic
literature. 1 8
The first element, possession of monopoly power, initially requires
us to define both the geographic market and the product market in which
the defendant's power will be determined, a process that has often
112 If the Brunswick mergers, which were the alleged antitrust violations, had actually generated
anticompetiive consequences in the form of "deep pocket" acts of the Brunswick firms, and if the
plaintiffs had been injured as a result of those deep pocket activities, the Court would have found
antitrust standing, under the Associated General Contractors analysis. The plaintiffs, as competitors of
the merged entities, would have been entitled to recover damages because they would have suffered
direct injury from the anticompetitive consequences made possible by the defendant's antitrust
violations.
113 See supra text accompanying notes 91-108.
114 See infra text accompanying notes 150-54.
115 See infra text accompanying notes 121-40 and 155-58.
116 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). See infra text accompanying notes 134-40.
117 See infra text accompanying notes 155-58.
118 See, e.g., H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTTRUST LAw 136-38 (1985).
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proved difficult for courts to accomplish.' 19 Decisions have defined "monopoly power" as the ability to control price within the market or exclude competitors from the market. However, courts have almost
invariably accepted evidence of a defendant's very high percentage of the
total sales made in the relevant market as a surrogate for empirically determining whether a defendant has actually exercised control of prices or
1 20
excluded competitors from competing in the relevant market.
On the second, or "exlusionary conduct" element, the law has been
considerably less easy to summarize. It is clear that monopolization can
produce adverse economic consequences, because a monopolist has no
effective price competition to restrain it from raising its prices to make
the largest possible profit. The loss to the economy is not the "excess"
profits the monopolist may obtain, but is the inefficiency caused by the
fact that at least some buyers will forego purchasing the monopolized
product and settle for a less valuable, but lower priced, substitute product. This substitution would not be required if the monopolized product
were sold at a lower price established through the process of
competition.'21
Monopoly pricing and the inefficiency it produces are detrimental to
society. However, it is also quite obvious that society benefits from the
competition of firms that are attempting to obtain a larger market share,
and at some point an extremely successful firm may obtain a monopoly
share of a particular market through product innovation or efficient operation. If the exclusionary conduct element of the monopolization offense could be satisfied by proof that the defendant merely competed in
an extremely effective manner, firms would never compete vigorously
when they approached a market share that is equated with monopoly
power. The potential problem is great, since courts accept approximately eighty percent as a minimum monopoly market share percentage,
with some authority for a smaller figure in certain circumstances.1 22
Thus, unless the exclusionary conduct element of the substantive mo119 The type of issue that courts must resolve in defining product markets include, for example,
whether championship boxing matches are in the same product market as other professional boxing
matches and whether glass bottles and metal cans occupy the same market in which food and beverage producers make the purchases for the packaging and vending of their products. See International Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959) (holding that championship
professional boxing matches constitute a separate market); and United States v. Container Corp. of
Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969) (holding that bottles and metal cans are in the same general "container"
market).
120 See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrrRuST 74 (1977) and decisions cited infra note
122.
121

H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 118, at 19-21; T. CALVANI

&J.SIEGFIRED,

ECONOMIc ANALYSIS AND

ANTrrRUST LAw 47-51 (1979).
122 See ABA, ANTrrRUST DEVELOPMENTS 118-19 (1984), L. SULLIVAN, supra note 120, at 74-76. See
also the following modern decisions: United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (87%
sufficient); InternationalBoxing Club, 358 U.S. at 249 (93% considered sufficient); United States v. E I.
DuPont, 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) (75% deemed sufficient); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.
(Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (90% sufficient and 60-64% deemed insufficient); and
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aft'd, 347 U.S. 521
(1954) (per curiam) (considerable weight in finding monopoly power given to a market share finding
of 75%, with the implication that a market share of over 50% with other factors could support a
finding of monopoly power). Older precedents include: United States v. International Harvester
Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927) (64% insufficient); United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417
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nopolization offense is difficult to establish, the extremely successful firm
in a market would strictly curtail its activities for fear of violating the statute and suffering the risk, if not the reality, of massive treble damage
liability.123
Leading firms in an industry may well be the most likely competitors
to produce product breakthroughs and new and more efficient methods
of production and distribution.124 If this argument has force, which even
advocates of vigorous antitrust enforcement will concede, the exclusionary conduct element of the monopolization offense should either be hard
to prove or certain in meaning so that leading firms will feel free to compete aggressively. On the other hand, heavily dominant firms often have
the economic muscle to engage in practices that drive competitors from a
market and produce a monopoly.
The general response of courts to this conflict has been to temporize
and thereby avoid definitive policy decisions on these issues. Modem
monopolization law begins with the 1940 United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America decision of the Second Circuit.' 2 5 Justice Learned Hand established that monopoly power would be determined by market percentage
shares in most instances and that any conduct on the part of a monopolist
that could not be described as the exercise of skill, foresight or industry
would be considered monopolization conduct.' 2 6 This ambiguous general conception of exclusionary conduct was obviously of little use to
managers or legal counsel of a leading firm for appraising the antitrust
litigation risks inherent in a new business move.
Unfortunately, the facts establishing the exlusionary conduct of
Alcoa did not provide further certainty. Alcoa was shown to have opened
new plants during its period of growth, often on the basis of projections
of anticipated demand for Alcoa aluminum. Alcoa stimulated this demand through discovery of new industrial uses for aluminum and
proselytizing such uses to potential aluminum buyers. While these
would not appear to be business practices harmful to the public good,
Justice Hand thought otherwise, stating:
True, [Alcoa] stimulated demand and opened new uses for the metal,
but not without making sure that it could supply what it had evoked.
(1920) (50% considered insufficient); and United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226 F. 62 (W.D.N.Y.
1915), appeal dismissed, 255 U.S. 578 (1921) (75-80%o constitutes monopoly power).
123 A firm possessing a very high market share actually is mindful of the possibility of the massive
expense of defending a private antitrust action successfully. This litigation expense, plus the potential for a treble damage judgment, will be taken into account, at least impressionisticly by the leading
firms in determining market strategy and business moves. Such a calculation can, as noted in the
text, lead to timidity by the leading firm.
124 R. BORK, TiE ANTRusT PARADOX 90-106 (1978); H. HovwrNaMP, supra note 118, at 19-20;
and R. POSNER, ANTIrusT LAW 15-22 (1976).
125 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) The Supreme Court was unable to consider the case because
four justices voluntarily disqualified themselves, thus depriving the Court of the minimum statutory
quorum of six justices. Congress then provided that such cases should be heard by the three most

senior judges of the relevant court of appeals. Accordingly, the Supreme Court certified the case to
the three distinguished judges of the Second Circuit (L. Hand, Swan, and A. Hand) who proceeded
to issue the celebrated opinon. P. AREEDA, ANTIrrusT ANALAYsis 154 (1981).
126 See 148 F.2d at 424 (discussion of market share) and id. at 430-31 (discussion of defendant's
conduct as something other than skill, foresight or industry).

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:643

There is no dispute as to this; "Alcoa" avows it as evidence of the skill,
energy and initiative with which it has always conducted its business; as
a reason why, having won its way by fair means, it should be commended, and not dismembered . ..
Nothing compelled [Alcoa] to
keep doubling and redoubling its capacity before others entered the
field. It insists that it never excluded competitors; but we can think of
no more effective exclusion than progressively to embrace each new
opportunity as it opened, and to face every newcomer with new capacity already geared into a great organization, having the advantage of
experience, trade connections and the elite of personnel. Only in case
we interpret "exclusion" as limited to manoeuvers not honestly industrial, but actuated solely by a desire to prevent competition, can such a
course, indefatigably pursued, be deemed not "exclusionary." So to
limit it would in our judgment emasculate the Act;12would
permit just
7
such consolidations as it was designed to prevent.
While Alcoa taught an uncertain concept of monopolization conduct, the United States Supreme Court seemed to approve it in the American Tobacco Co. v. United States 128 decision in 1946.129 In United States v.
Grinnell Corp. 3 0 Judge Charles Wyzanski elaborated on his reading of the
Alcoa decision. The Judge held that the government established the offense of monopolization when it proved that the defendant held a monopoly of the relevant market, unless the defendant could prove that its
monopoly position was attributable to praiseworthy competitive acts and
practices. 1 3 ' This proposition seems unsupportable because the language of the statute appears to require the government or a private
plaintiff to prove both elements of a charge of illegal monopolization
under section two of the Sherman Act. However, the Supreme Court did
not accept or refute the concept in affirming the lower court judgment,
13 2
and the uncertainty in the exclusionary conduct element continued.
Unfortunately, for two decades following the Grinnell decision the
Supreme Court did not consider any cases squarely raising the question
of the meaning of the exclusionary conduct element of the monopolization offense, and the issue was addressed only by commentators and
lower courts in such decisions as Berkey and Bonjorno.133 During this period, an understandable concern over automatically trebled damages,
awarded upon transgression of such a nebulous standard of conduct,
may have caused a number of courts to adopt the disaggregation
requirement.
In the summer of 1985 the Supreme Court delivered an unanimous
opinion in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highland Skiing Corp., which clarified
127 Id. at 430-31.
128 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
129 See id. at 813.
130 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), aff'd except as to decree, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
131 Id. at 248.
132 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71, 576-80 (1966). (This is the citation
that Areeda apparently uses for the quotations from the Supreme Court's Grinnell decision. P.
AREEDA, supra note 125, at 188).
133 See, e.g. Bonjorno v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 752 F.2d 802, 808-10 (3d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3284 (1986); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273-75,
281-85, & 291-94 (2d Cir. 1979); P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, Am-rrusT LAw 66-67 (1978); H.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 118, at 10-158; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 120, at 94-105.
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the concept of monopolization conduct to a considerable degree. 34 The
Court rendered the decision in a private monopolization action brought
by the owner of one of four ski areas in Aspen, Colorado, against the
owner of the other three ski areas. The trial resulted in a treble damage
judgment of $7,500,000 for the plaintiff. At issue on the appeal was
whether the defendant had engaged in monopolization conduct by withdrawing from a joint marketing arrangement with the plaintiff. Under
the joint marketing plan, skiers at Aspen had been offered a six day ticket
with which they could ski at any of the four Aspen areas (three owned by
the defendant and one owned by the plaintiff).
The Supreme Court approved the following trial court instruction:
In considering whether the means or purposes were anti-competitive or exclusionary, you must draw a distinction here between practices which tend to exclude or restrict competition on the one hand
and the success of a business which reflects
only a superior product, a
well-run business, or luck, on the other.13 5
The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence to determine if it supported
the jury finding that the defendant's withdrawal from the joint marketing
plan was "exclusionary." The Court's discussion established that the
plaintiff, without the help of a presumption, has the burden of proving
that the defendant engaged in exclusionary conduct in obtaining or
maintaining its monopoly position. 136 The opinion also significantly rationalized the law of monopolization by providing a general analysis for
determining exclusionary conduct.
To determine whether the termination of the marketing plan was
exclusionary conduct, the Court considered three factual questions: The
termination's effect upon the plaintiff, the termination's effect upon consumers, and whether the defendant had any "normal" or efficiency-producing business purpose for the termination.' 3 7 It appears from this
analysis that the Court considers conduct to be exclusionary under section two of the Sherman Act if the conduct impairs a rival's ability to
compete and cannot be justified on the basis that it either produces consumer benefit through a better product or constitutes an attempt by the
defendant to increase the efficiency of his business operations. Reviewing the facts of the case, the Court found that the termination of the
multi-area ticket plan harmed the plaintiff through loss of market share,
deprived consumers of a valuable product and was not justified by "any
normal business purpose" offered by the defendant. In the words of the
Court: "Thus the evidence supports an inference that [Aspen] Ski Co.
was not motivated by efficiency concerns and that it was willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange for a per38
ceived long-run impact on its smaller rival."1
134 472 U.S. 585 (1985). Although the opinion was unanimous,Justice White did not participate
in the decision of the case.
135 Id at 596.
136 This point is established sub silentio by the opinion, which assumes that the plaintiff must produce evidence proving exclusionary conduct. Id at 605-11.
137 Id.
138 Id at 610-11.
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It thus appears that the Court has determined that exclusionary conduct is activity that harms a competitor economically and is motivated
only by a desire to obtain a long-run benefit when the competitor has
been destroyed or substantially impaired. The Court specifically noted
that "specific intent" is not a required element of a plaintiff's case in an
action based on alleged monopolization as opposed to an attempt to monopolize case. 13 9 However, it would appear that Aspen Skiing goes a long
way toward requiring specific intent to obtain a monopoly as a "culpability standard" in monopolization law. It is hard to see how specific intent
to obtain a monopoly in a market differs from proof that the defendant
intended to forego present economic benefit in order to obtain an advantage predicated upon an ability in the long run to control prices.
Assuredly the exclusionary conduct concept announced in Aspen Skiing will not remove all uncertainty for antitrust litigators and counselors.
However, it possesses enough clarity to be highly useful to courts and
competitors. Furthermore, the Aspen Skiing exclusionary conduct test
40
gives clear direction on the issue of disaggregation.'
V. Evaluation of the Disaggregation Requirement
The disaggregation requirement suffers from two conceptual defects, each a separate ground for rejecting the rule. First, the Berkey
court's reliance upon the Brunswick antitrust injury concept was erroneous due to the difference between the substantive antitrust prohibitions
involved in the two cases. Second, the development of the "antitrust
standing" concept in the McCready and Associated General Contractor decisions of the Supreme Court implicitly repudiates the disaggregation rule,
because the rule would virtually eliminate almost all potential plaintiffs in
monopolization actions.
A third reason exists for rejecting the disaggregation rule that has
nothing to do with the jurisprudence that has developed regarding section four of the Clayton Act. The establishment of a balanced and analytical law of exclusionary conduct in the 1985 Aspen Skiing decision obviates
the pressing need to curtail the exposure of monopolists to treble damage awards. The three reasons for rejecting the disaggregation
require14
ment in monopolization cases are discussed in detail below.
A.

The Misplaced Reliance Upon the Brunswick Concept
of "Antitrust Injury"
While both Brunswick and Berkey were treble damage actions under
section four of the Clayton Act, the substantive provisions of the antitrust
law involved in the two decisions are markedly different. That difference
in the substantive prohibitions is so large that the Berkey court's reliance
upon the "antitrust injury" language from the Brunswick decision was
139 Id. at 602-03.
140 See infra text accompanying notes 155-58.
141 The "misreading of Brunswick" reason is discussed at infra text accompanying notes 142-49.
The "antitrust standing" reason is discussed at infra text accompanying notes 150-54. Finally, the
"Aspen Skiing" reason is discussed at infra text accompanying notes 155-58.
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erroneous. 14 2
Section seven of the Clayton Act, which was involved in Brunswick, is
prophylactic. The section was designed as an instrument to be used to
void mergers that would probably cause an anticompetitive market in the
future. Thus, the anticompetitive harm, or "antitrust injury," of a particular merger that section seven was designed to prevent might never occur, even though the statute would be violated by the merger when the
probability of such harm is found. 143 This was, of course, the exact situa14 4
tion that occurred in the Brunswick case.
In contrast, section two of the Sherman Act is a curative provision,
which focuses on existing anticompetitive market situations. Thus, the
anticompetitive harm that section two of the Sherman Act was designed
to address, a monopolized market, must be found to exist before the section is violated. Society has a clear interest in vigorous competition, and
the judicial inclusion of the exclusionary conduct requirement in the law
of section two of the Sherman Act serves that interest.145 However, the
harm to competition, and the concommitant harm to society, always occurs when one firm holds such power in a market that it can control price
or exclude competition.1 46 If a position of monopoly power is held by a
firm that has engaged in "exclusionary" practices to obtain or maintain
that position, and is therefore presumably willing to engage in further
exclusionary acts to keep the monopoly position, the threat to society is
even more pronounced.
Because anticompetitive effect is always present in a market that has
been monopolized in violation of section two of the Sherman Act, any
participant in that market has experienced "injury of the type .

.

. that

flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful [meaning the monopolization of the market by the use of exclusionary practices]." The
injury will take the form of either increased prices paid by the monopolist's customers, or profits lost by excluded competitors of the
1 47
monopolist.
Another way of appreciating the crucial difference between the two
142 See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 297 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1093 (1980), where the court states:
we must determine the proper measure of damages in a § 2 case by juxtaposing the basic
rule for antitrust damages with the fundamental principles of law under § 2 .... The basic
rule was set forth in Brunswick ... where the Supreme Court declared that plaintiffs in an
antitrust action must prove "injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent
and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful."
See also the discussion of the Brunswick opinion supra text accompanying notes 70-82.
143 Congress authorized judicial intervention into the marketplace under § 7 of the Clayton Act
as a prophylactic measure only in merger situations. Hostility to mergers as a business practice was
common during the early part of this century and, at least in part, the Clayton Act reflects this
hostility. Section 7 of that Act was amended in 1950, but its essential features, which are the concern
at issue, remain unchanged from 1914.
144 See discussion of the Brunswick decision supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
145 See discussion of the two elements of Sherman Act § 2 offense supra text accompanying notes
118-21.
146 Recall that ability to control price or exclude competition is the legal definition of monopoly
power. See supra text accompanying notes 119-20.
147 There may also be injury to firms that sell goods and services to the monopolist and its marginal competitors. Those sellers will be faced with a monopsony situation and will make the sales at a
lower price than would prevail in a competitive market. It should also be recalled that the lost profits
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provisions is to note that section seven of the Clayton Act principally
focuses upon a specific type of business conduct, mergers; while section two
of the Sherman Act focuses upon a specific type of market condition, monopoly. Thus, if section two is violated, it is axiomatic that anticompetitive effect will be felt in the defendants' market. Quantifying the injury a
particular market participant has suffered, while perhaps difficult, is a
separate consideration from whether anticompetitive effect is likely to be
present in a situation in which section two has been violated. There is no
doubt that such anticompetitive effect is likely if not invariable.
Protection of competition and not competitors is a basic theme of
judicial interpretation of the antitrust laws, and this concern was the explicit justification for the Supreme Court's antitrust injury pronouncement in Brunswick.148 Because of the nature of the prohibition in section
two of the Sherman Act, competition has been harmed whenever a violation of the section has been proved. Thus, treble damages should be
awarded on the basis of the usual standard of proof in order to protect
the process of competition by deterring future illegal monopolists. It
therefore follows that since competition is always injured when section
two of the Sherman Act is violated, the Berkey court erred in requiring the
plaintiff to prove the amount of damages by anything more than a "reasonable inference," the proof standard under section four of the Clayton
Act. The proof standard mandated by the disaggregation requirement is
the more burdensome "more probable than not" standard, which has
been rejected in antitrust treble damage actions under the decisions of
1 49
the Supreme Court.
B.

The DisaggregationRequirement and the Law of Antitrust Standing

For the reasons stated in the preceding section, the validity of the
disaggregation requirement under the Brunswick antitrust injury concept
is at least questionable. It is more clear that the requirement is inconsistent with the law of "antitrust standing," developed by the Supreme
Court in the years following the Berkey decision. 150 The practical effect of
the Berkey court's announcement of the disaggregation requirement in
the monopolization claim context is to require a plaintiff in a private monopolization case to prove the amount of its damages by a more probable
than not standard. Without such proof, a plaintiff has no right to have
the jury consider the questions of whether the plaintiff is entitled to any
damages and what the amount of those damages should be. This
"amount of damage" requirement adds, as a practical matter, another
antitrust standing requirement for the plaintiff in a monopolization case
to meet.
The additional antitrust standing requirement is inconsistent with
of the excluded competitors of the monopolist may take the form of lost investment in the event
competitors of the monopolist are driven into bankruptcy.
148 Cf. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-68 n.14 (1984) (citing
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977)).
149 See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
150 See supra text accompanying notes 70-84, for a discussion of the development of the law of
antitrust standing.
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the four factor antitrust standing test announced in the Associated General
Contractors decision. 15 1 In that decision, the Supreme Court determined
that plaintiffs are entitled to seek treble damages when the injury is of the
type the antitrust law provision was enacted to forestall, the plaintiff suffered the injury in a direct fashion, the fact of damage is not speculative,
and the litigation is manageable. Once those factors have been established, the plaintiff is entitled to seek treble damages under section four
of the Clayton Act, meeting the usual burdens of proof that have been
developed in the case law interpreting section four of the Clayton Act:
"more probable than not" proof of the fact of violation and the fact of
152
damage and "reasonable inference" proof of the amount of damage.
The disagreggation requirement in the Berkey opinion requires a
plaintiff in a private monopolization case to prove the amount of its damages before the plaintiff is entitled to seek relief under section four of the
Clayton Act. This is an additional factor, unauthorized by Associated General Countractors and inconsistent with the third factor established by that
decision: Whether the damage claim of the plaintiff is speculative in nature. For a damage claim to be "certain" as opposed to speculative, authorities require two things: Proof meeting the preponderance of the
evidence standard that the plaintiff suffered some damage and evidence
introduced into the record supporting a "reasonable inference" that the
plaintiff's damage was in a particular amount. In contrast to this, the
Berkey court requires a showing that the amount of damage can be proved
on a more probable than not standard. This standard is onerous and in
conflict with Associated General Contractors.
Regarding the specific market position of the plaintiff in Berkey, it
would seem that the antitrust standing of a purchaser from an illegal monopolist is clear beyond argument. Such purchasers deal directly with
the monopolist and suffer damages as certain and susceptible of convincing proof as any possible damage claim under section four. If Congress
intended to confer the right of treble damage recovery on any class of
market participants, it would appear to be direct purchasers from an illegal monopolist.
What appears to be the most important of the factors mentioned in
Associated General Contactors, the directness of the injury suffered, is easily
established by competitors and purchasers in the illegally monopolized
market. This directness eliminates a principle concern in antitrust standing analysis, the danger of duplicate recovery. 5 3 Overcharged purchasers in a monopolized market are entitled to recover the amount by which
the prices they paid exceeded the prices they would have paid in a competitive market. The competitive market price includes the profit that a
hypothetical seller would have realized in making the sale to the plaintiff.
On the other hand, an injured competitor sues to collect the profit it
would have made on hypothetical sales if the market had been competi151 Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519 (1983). See supra text accompanying notes 91-110.
152 See discussion of the burdens of proof under § 4 of the Clayton Act supra text accompanying
notes 52-59.
153 See Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 544.
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tive. This profit figure is obviously not available as an item of damage to
the injured purchaser, and there is no danger of duplicate recovery. The
Court in the Aspen Skiing decision clearly approved the proof of lost prof154
its by an injured competitor.
C.

Aspen Skiing Minimizes Possible Concern About Overdeterrence

Given the uncertain state of the law of "exclusionary conduct" prior
to the Aspen Skiing decision, a concern over possible overdeterrence chilling valuable competitive activity by dominant firms was a reasonable, if
not a compelling, reason to adopt the disaggregation requirement. Society would hardly benefit if an ambiguous standard of conduct deterred
dominant firms from introducing new products and business procedures.
Two solutions of the pre-Aspen Skiing overdeterrence problem were apparently available. One, taken in the Berkey decision, was to virtually
eliminate the possibility of large damage awards through imposing a difficult standard of proof for the amount of damage. The Aspen Skiing
Court adopted the second solution, reformulating the standard of conduct under the monopolization prohibition in section two of the Sherman Act. The reformulation made the conduct standard certain enough
for intelligent compliance by law abiding firms.' 55
Since Aspen Skiing, the plaintiff in a private monopolization action
must virtually prove the defendant acted with a "specific intent" to monopolize in order to meet the terms of the reformulated exclusionary
conduct element of the monopolization offense. If the evidence of exclusionary conduct must be sufficient to support a finding that the defendant was willing to forego short-term profit and long-run efficiency for the
purpose of reaping monopoly profits, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant calculatedly planned the illegal monopolization. No firm that
is genuinely intent on prevailing over rivals by competition on the merits
will cross over this new standard inadvertently. Thus, "overdeterrence"
is no longer a problem, and the Berkey court's solution can be discarded
without loss.
If a lingering concern remains over the uncertainty faced by a dominant firm under section two of the Sherman Act, it would appear to be
misplaced. Although automatic trebling of damages can produce very
large judgments, Congress chose the automatic trebling of damages lan154 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 598 (1985) where the
Court mentions the fact that the plaintiff received a verdict of $2.5 million, trebled to $7.5 million,
and the facts alleged in the case are only consistent with the proposition that this sum represents the
plaintiff's lost profits. It should be noted that in the Aspen Skiing decision, the Court did not indicate
approval of a disaggregation requirement, even though the facts apparently would have allowed the
defendant to make an argument that disaggregation was appropriate. Because the Court did not
address the issue, the reader of the decision cannot tell if the argument was tendered to this Court.
Consequently, there is no precedential value in the fact that the Court did not address the disaggregation requirement issue. However, Aspen Skiing is the first extensive discussion of the exclusionary
conduct concept by the Court since the Second Circuit's Alcoa decision, and it is the traditionally
ambiguous exclusionary conduct concept that previously provided arguable practical justification for
the disaggregation requirement. See supra text accompanying notes 115-33. Thus, the Court's silence on the point may be more significant than would ordinarily be the case.
155 For a discussion of the reformulated Aspen Skiing text for exclusionary conduct, see supra text
accompanying notes 135-39.
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guage used in section four of the Clayton Act in the last century and has
never decided to change it.156 The fact that section four of the Clayton
Act authorizes an award of damages that may seem unreasonable is not a
valid reason for the judiciary to eliminate the remedy through imposing a
57
disaggregation requirement.'
The disaggregation requirement virtually eliminates the potential
for any damage recovery in situations in which the monopolist has engaged in the wrongful conduct several years prior to the plaintiff's participation in the market. Market affecting events occurring subsequent to
the wrongful conduct may make it impossible to determine what portion
of the defendant's monopoly position is attributable to the wrongful conduct. However, the defendant's wrongful conduct, if it is to meet the
"exclusionary conduct" test of Aspen Skiing, must be a deliberate and successful attempt to gain or hold monopoly market strength without earning it through fair competition. Treble damages recovery for injury
produced by such conduct is appropriate if it is admitted that actions
under section four of the Clayton Act are a valued deterrent to conduct
that violates the antitrust laws. This assumption is well based in the language of Supreme Court opinions.' 58
However, it is valid to consider the plight of a monopoly power
holder that has engaged in exclusionary conduct and is faced with massive potential liability in a treble damage action. If the wrongful conduct
was not essential to attaining or maintaining the defendant's monopoly,
it serves no interest of society to hold the firm liable for a competitor's
losses or a customer's overpayments that do not flow from the firm's
wrongful conduct. This concern should be reconciled with the general
proposition that an antitrust violator should bear the risk of uncertainty
about the amount of the economic injury inflicted by the violator's
wrongdoing. Such a reconciliation can lead to a solution that avoids the
156 When signed into law by President Harrison onJuly 2, 1890, the Sherman Act contained eight
sections. Section 7 of the Act read as follows:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or
corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act may sue
therefor in any Circuit Court of the United States in the district in which the defendant
resides or is found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.
reprintedin A. WALKER, HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN LAW 30-31 (19 10). With the passage of the Clayton
Act in 1914, § 7 of the Sherman Act was repealed.
157 Areeda and Turner refer to the possible unwarranted nature of the market intervention by
courts in situations in which exclusionary conduct was not the primary reason for the defendant's
monopoly position, and recommend a disaggregation requirement in their treatise. 3 P. AREEDA &
D. TURNER, ANmrruST LAw 86-87 (1978). The Berkey court cited Areeda and Turner as support for
the imposition of the disaggregation requirement in private monopolization treble damage cases.
603 F.2d at 297.
However, as mentioned in the text, Congress decided to make the damage awards under § 4 of
the Clayton Act very large through automatic trebling. If this was unreasonable, it is still properly
the exclusive perogative of Congress to change the law of these damage awards. For a discussion of
legislation limiting the application of the treble damage language in § 4 of the Clayton Act in specific
situations, see text accompanying note 51.
158 See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981) ("The very
idea of treble damages reveals an intent to punish past, and to deter future, unlawful conduct, not to
ameliorate the liability of wrongdoers."); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S.
481 (1968); see supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
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problems of the Berkey disaggregation requirement, but satisfactorily addresses reasonable concerns caused by automatic trebling of damages
awarded on inherently uncertain market predictions or reconstructions.
VI.

A Proposed Solution to the Disaggregation Requirement Problem

The basic points to recall in considering a solution to the problem
bear repeating. First, hypothetical market results are very difficult to
prove with the degree of certainty that lawyers and judges find comfortable. Second, for unassailable reasons of policy, it is settled law that the
risk of uncertainty attending such proofs must be borne by a defendant
firm that has violated the antitrust laws, even though the damages to be
awarded as a result of such proofs will be trebled. Third, the illegally
monopolizing defendant should be held liable only for economic losses
caused wholly, or in part, by the defendant's actions that violate section
two of the Sherman Act.
The first step in formulating a solution is to adapt serviceable elements of the traditional law of treble damage actions for more effective
use in private monopolization actions. Thus, the well-accepted requirement that the plaintiff has suffered some damage must be shown to be
more reasonable than not should be strengthened in monopolization
cases. This could be accomplished by including a jury instruction statement on the subject of damages requiring a high level of threshhold
proof before the jury can consider the amount of damages that the plaintiff suffered. Thus, the jury should be instructed that in cases in which
illegal monopolization is alleged, the plaintiff must present clear and
convincing evidence to the jury proving that the defendant's exclusionary
conduct had some effect upon the market and that this market effect had
an impact upon the plaintiff's business, either through increased prices
(if the plaintiff is a customer) or through lost sales opportunities (if the
plaintiff is a competitor). 5 9 In practical terms, the judge should ask the
jury to find that the plaintiff has convincingly shown that but for the exclusionary conduct of the defendant, the plaintiff would have either paid
less for the product it bought, or the plaintiff would have made a greater
profit on its operations.
Strengthening the requirement that a Clayton Act treble damage
plaintiff prove the fact of damage will insure that trivial exclusionary conduct will not subject a monopolist to the risk of substantial damages in a
treble damage suit. If the plaintiff satisfies the clear and convincing standard of proof on the fact of damage, it should recover the entire overcharge or loss of business it can show resulted from the fact that the
defendant held a monopoly, unless the defendant can prove, again by
clear and convincing evidence, that the amount of the overcharge or
business loss can be disaggregated into a portion attributable to exclusionary acts and a portion attributable to legitimate competitive acts.
159 The jury should also be instructed that expert opinion may properly constitute much of the
evidence on effect on markets, and that expert evidence can be considered clear and convincing by
the jury, in the same way as eyewitness testimony or objective evidence may be considered to be
clear and convincing proof of a fact.
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Again, such proof will invariably take the form of expert testimony, and it
will be up to the jury to determine if the defendant's proof on the point is
clear and convincing.
It is informative to note that the shifting of the burden of proof of
the feasibility of the disaggregation requirement accords with the approach adopted by courts to the issue. For instance, the court in Memorex
endorsed the disaggregation requirement after noting that defendant
IBM had shown that disaggregation of damages was possible.1 60 In Litton, on the other hand, the appellate court apparently rejected the disaggregation requirement at least in part because the plaintiff's expert
testimony established that disaggregation would not be "fruitful" and
the defendant offered no evidence on the point. 16 1 While the recommended instructions may increase the amount of instruction given to the
jury, in a trial that is bifurcated into liability and damage phases, lengthening the damage instructions to include the recommended points
should not prove onerous to the jury in the damage phase. Federal Rule
of civil antitrust damof Civil Procedure 42(b) authorizes the bifurcation
62
age trials into liability and damage phases.'
As a practical matter, if enough time has elapsed after the completion of the exclusionary conduct, the defendant will probably not be able
to offer clear and convincing proof that the damages suffered by the
plaintiff can be disaggregated. This is because the effect on the market of
defendant's exclusionary conduct will have been in turn affected by subsequent legitimate actions of the defendant. Disentangling the effect of
the wrongful conduct from the effect of subsequent legitimate competitive acts on a particular participant in the market would normally be a
matter of mere speculation. This consequence is fully consistent with the
Supreme Court's antitrust injury statement in Brunswick that "[t]he injury
should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation."' 163 The phrase, "anticompetitive acts," when referring to an illegal monopolist, should
include legitimate acts made possible by illegal activity if the final result
is a distortion of the market of monopoly proportions. This is consistent
with the unique monopoly market power element of the monopolization
prohibition in section two of the Sherman Act. The competitive evil of
monopolization is so great that any activity capitalizing on such a market
condition, when attributable to exclusionary conduct, should be equated
with "anticompetitive acts" as that phrase is used in Brunswick.
Ajury instruction on the crucial consideration of the time the exclusionary conduct occurs would also be helpful. Therefore, the jury should
be informed that after a significant passage of time following the occur160 See ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp, 458 F. Supp. 423, 434-35 (N.D. Cal. 1978),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981).
161 Litton Sys., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 825 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1073 (1984).
162 See, e.g., MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1166-69
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
163 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,489 (1977) (quoting Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 125 (1969)).
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rence of the exclusionary conduct, disaggregation is legally impossible.
What constitutes a significant period for purposes of the instruction will
vary according to the size, structure and dynamic quality of the specific
market involved in the litigation.
Finally, the judge should include an instruction clarifying the point
addressed by the majority in the MCI decision. The court in that case
was concerned that the jury might have established a large damage award
without taking into account that certain of the plaintiff's losses were attributable to plaintiff's internal operations, such as bad management,
and had no relationship to the act of the defendant.16 To meet this concern, the jury should be instructed that it is particularly important in establishing damages in monopolization cases to consider the acts of the
plaintiff to determine if the plaintiff's losses would have been suffered by
it in a competitive market.
VII. Conclusion
Under well-accepted antitrust doctrine, the disaggregation requirement is inappropriate in private monopolization actions in the form set
forth by the Berkey court. The solution tendered above recognizes that
the requirement may, in some instances, be a useful device to avoid an
inequitably large damage award. However, the proposed solution places
the burden of proving the feasibility of the requirement on the defendant, the party for whose benefit the requirement was fashioned.

164

708 F.2d at 1160-64.

